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ABSTRACT 
Growth development theorists such as Rowstow have averred that third world countries 
(TWCs) need foreign Aid to stimulate development and move them into the 'take-off stage' 
which is characterised by growth and development. However, after decades of aid inflow into 
TWCs, the majority of TWCs are still struggling to achieve their development objectives. 
Therefore, it is doubtful if aids alone can jumpstart development in TWCs. This reality has given 
rise to a plethora of alternate propositions aimed at realising the development objectives of 
TWCs. The central argument of this paper is that Aid alone cannot improve the status of TWCs. 
It is further argued in the paper that Aid needs to be complemented by stimulants (initiated 
within TWCs) such as Remittance, Taxation, and Public-Private Partnership (PPP) to solve their 
economic development problems. To this end, it is suggested that an approach which combines 
indigenous options with Aid will significantly advance the development objectives of TWCs. 
 
[1]  INTRODUCTION 
Third World Countries are infamously designated, in the context of development studies, as 
countries from the regions of the world characterised by poor socio-economic conditions 
and low rankings on the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index (HDI). 1  The 
provision of aid packages from the first world, or developed countries are one of the main 
strategies adopted in a bid to ameliorate the socio-economic depravity in TWCs. The foreign 
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aid packages whether in the form of financial, technical assistance, food aid, grant and loans 
with at least a 25% grant element, are given for reasons that are actuated by either 
humanitarian emotion, political and economic self-interest.  
While there are cogent reasons for developed countries' continued (foreign) aids 
interventions in TWCs, it is questionable if foreign Aid, as a mono-therapy has been an 
adequate strategy to rescue TWCs from their developmental doldrums. First, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that there is a positive relationship between Aid and corruption in 
TWCs.2 Secondly, TWCs do not always exercise full discretion on what and how foreign Aid 
is utilised. For example, Osei points out that the practice whereby aid donors'…impose 
restrictions [i.e. aid tying] on where the recipient can spend aid funds, and/or end-use 
restrictions—through the specification of commodities and projects for which external 
assistance can be used — has long raised concerns about the quality and effectiveness of 
Aid.3 Thus, while it was reported in 2013, by the OECD that: 'Development aid rose by 6.1% 
in real terms in 2013 to reach the highest level ever recorded, despite continued pressure on 
budgets in OECD countries since the global economic crisis…',4 the utilisation rate and real 
impact of foreign Aid in recipient countries is questionable. Shah identifies a couple of 
fundamental challenges militating against a positive impact of foreign Aid on TWCs to 
include. The first relates to the conditions imposed by donors that the recipient of Aid must 
use overpriced goods and services from the donor countries. Second is that foreign aid 
amounts being dwarfed by rich country protectionism that denies market access for poor 
country products, while the rich nations use Aid as a lever to open poor country markets to 
their products.5 
From the foregoing, it is clear that overdependence on Aid as a panacea for economic 
underdevelopment in TWCs has proved to be problematic. As such, the objective of this 
paper is to propose alternative policy options (macroeconomic tools) that could complement 
                                                        
2 Djankov and others argue that foreign aid, like natural resources, share a common characteristic: they can be 
appropriated by corrupt politicians without having to resort to unpopular, and normally less profitable, measures like 
taxation. See S. Djankov et al, ‘The Curse of Foreign Aid’, (2008) 13 Journal of Economic Growth 169, 171. See also 
A. Bodomo ‘African Diaspora Remittances are Better than Foreign Aid Funds’, (2013) 14 (4) World Economics 21, 
25. See generally W. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much 
Ill and So Little Good, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); H.C.A. Pandya, ‘International Aid simply props up Third 
World Corruption’, Mail Online Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2051448/International-aid-
simply-props-world-corruption.html> accessed 08 July 2014; V. Fritz and I. Kolstad, ‘Corruption and Aid Modalities’ 
U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre U4 Issue 4 (2008); W. Kasper, ‘Make Poverty History: Tackle Corruption’, 
Centre for Independent Studies Working Paper No 67 (2007) <www.cis.org.au/publications/issue-
analysis/article/831-make-poverty-history-tackle-corruption> accessed 08 July 2014.  
3  B. Osei, ‘How Aid Tying Can Impose Additional Cost’, (2005) 17 (3) African Development Review 348, 349-350ff 
360. 
4  ‘Aid to developing countries rebounds in 2013 to reach an all-time high’, Available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm> 
accessed 31 January 2015.  
5  A. Shah, ‘Foreign Aid for Development Assistance’, (2014) Global Issues Available at: 
<http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/foreign-aid-development-assistance> accessed 31 January 2015. 
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foreign Aid as a driver of sustainable development in TWCs. The following section highlights 
some features of foreign Aid that makes it inadequate as the sole or main method for 
changing the developmental status of TWCs. Part 2 recommends options that could serve as 
complementary to aid for the development of the region. Part 3 concludes the paper.  
[2]  FOREIGN AID  
Foreign Aid is that part of capital inflow into states which is not a product of market forces. 
It is primarily the official government - to - government transfer of financial and technical 
resources for social and economic development programmes. 6  It could also be capital 
transfers or technical assistance and training.7 It is basically the transfer from states with 
resources to spare to those with needs. According to Osei: 
The fundamental idea of foreign Aid was that resources would be transferred to 
developing countries on concessional terms, that is, on terms and conditions more 
generous than those on credits obtainable from the world's capital markets. The idea 
of concessionality is to enable aid patterns to be compatible not just with the aim of 
growth but with a position of net indebtedness that is tolerable in the long term in the 
recipient countries. 8  
One of the most popular sources of Aid to TWCs is the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA).9 Though a subset of foreign investment, aids differ from foreign investment per se. 
This is because ordinarily, the former, are actuated by considerations other than market 
forces.10 However, from a socio-economic standpoint, aids are neither gift nor are they a 
manifestation of altruism.  In this regard, Oya notes that the giving of foreign Aid is 
'…motivated by a mixture of alleged altruism, economic interests, historical ties and geo-
                                                        
6  M.K. Jallow, ‘Foreign Aid and Under-development in Africa’, Available at: 
<http://www.probeinternational.org/foreign-aid/foreign-aid-and-under-development-africa> accessed 08 July 2014. 
7 Aid in form of military assistance includes supply of military hardware at subsidised rates, supply of military 
technical assistance such as military presence to a country in crisis or conflict with another country, military 
subversions, coups, assassinations, etc.  
8 Osei (n 3) 349. 
9 See OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043> accessed 08 July 
2014 for a discourse on the nature of ODAs; and for statistics on global aid flow, see Development Aid at a Glance: 
Statistics by Region - the Developing World (2010 edition). Available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/5/42139479.pdf> accessed 08 July 2014. ODA receipts comprises of 
disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. ODA statistic compiled by the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) measure aid as well as 
serve as a convenient indicator of international aid flow. See Official Development Assistance Available at: < 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm>. Aid flows from DAC 
donor countries totalled USD 129 billion in 2010, the highest level ever, and an increase of 6.5% over 2009; see 
Development: Aid increases, but with worrying trends, Available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_47519517_1_1_1_1,00.html> accessed 08 July 
2014. 
10 See I. A. Aniyie, ‘Foreign Investment and the Development of the Third World: An Examination of the Realities’ 
(2012) 1 Journal of Contemporary Law 155-176, where the distinctions and similarities between aid and foreign 
investment was highlighted. 
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strategic (imperialist) considerations…'11 Thus, it is important to determine whose interests 
are best served by foreign Aid by reflecting on two interlinked questions: is foreign Aid really 
in the best interest of the recipients and is it as effective as proponents of the growth theory 
of development make it out to be?    
The growth theory of development as propounded by Rostow posits that development in 
any society or state is linear and in five stages: the traditional society; pre-conditions for 
take-off; take-off; drive to maturity; and, age of high mass consumption.12 According to this 
theory, TWCs are either in the traditional society or pre-condition stage and require foreign 
Aid to move them to the "take-off" stage, which according to the theorists is the most critical 
level. It is at the "take-off" stage that industrialisation and economic growth is possible.13 
This theory may, however, be critiqued on the basis that there are drawbacks in the reliance 
of foreign Aid that question its effectiveness as a catalyst for launching TWCs to the take-off 
stage of their economic development. First, foreign Aid is often given based on conditions.14 
For instance, it is often a stipulation that the Aid must be spent on goods and services 
produced in the country, providing the Aid or in selected countries. The aid package is also 
often provided based on the condition that it must be utilised in a particular manner; or, the 
recipient state is to arrange its affairs in a particular manner – which oftentimes is according 
to prevailing economic orientations that do not (adequately) take the socio-economic 
peculiarities of the recipient-state into cognisance.15 For instance, TWCs are cajoled into 
adopting mercantilistic orientation resulting in the liberalisation of their import regime. 
Without corresponding market access for their exports in industrialised markets as a result 
of the existence of numerous tariffs and non-tariff barriers, the TWCs become burdened with 
perennial trade and balance of payment deficits, financial instability, debt, recession or 
stagnation and underdevelopment. 
Another basis for criticising the postulation that foreign Aid gets TWCs to the take-off stage 
is that TWCs often lack the absorptive capacity to maximally utilise aids as deficient or 
derelict infrastructure and technically competent personnel, amongst others, plague them. 
It is typical for TWCs who secure foreign Aid in the form of modern machinery and 
equipment to source for expatriate personnel to operate and maintain them because they 
lack indigenous capacity. Thus, where the foreign Aid is meant for a developmental purpose, 
the foregoing has the consequence of increasing the cost of the project and by extension, 
reducing the value of the Aid. Furthermore, a hypothetical situation as above has the effect 
                                                        
11  C. Oya, ‘The Political Economy of Development Aid as Main Source of Foreign Finance for Poor African 
Countries: Loss of Policy Space and Possible Alternatives from East Asia’, (Second Conference of International 
Forum on Comparative Political Economy of Globalisation, Beijing, September 2006) 4.  
12  See W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960).  
13 Ibid. 
14 Osei (n 8).  
15 See M. Khor, Globalisation and the South: Some Critical Issues, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 2000) 22-27.    
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of preventing the transfer of technology/ technical knowledge. It is also an avenue for rent-
seeking donors to exploit recipient states as it creates a situation where some of the funds 
from the Aid are repatriated to the state of origin in value-added form or as income.  
Also, foreign Aid is perceived as incapable of stimulating and sustaining the development of 
TWCs because of its cyclicality and volatility. Thornton examines the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy in 37 low-income African economies over sample periods of up to 44 years and finds 
that those African countries which are more dependent on foreign aid inflows and are 
characterised by lower levels of corruption are more procyclical.16 Regarding volatility, the 
value of aid volatility is huge. It has been estimated to cost between $0.07 and $0.28 per 
dollar of Aid, depending on the donor. 17  Finally, the uncertainty that surrounds aids 
packages, particularly with regards to timing and volume, makes long-term planning difficult 
for the recipient country and has potential negative fiscal impacts on their economy. The 
economic wellbeing of the donor-country predicates the frequency and quantum of aid 
packages with donors more willing to provide aid packages when their economies are 
robust. When potential donor countries face economic difficulties - such as the economic 
recession of 200818 - the flow of foreign aids slows down, as these countries have to shore 
up their reserves to (re) stabilise their economy.  
[3]  PRESENTING COMPLEMENTARIES 
The previous section highlighted the fundamental concerns why foreign Aid is considered 
both unreliable and insufficient either as the single or main source of funding to develop 
TWCs sustainably. Therefore a change of approach to the treatment of TWCs development 
malady is appropriate. The focus hereafter is an examination of what is considered 
complementary to aid in the process of developing the third world. These are remittance, 
taxation and public-private partnership (PPP).  
                                                        
16 See J. Thornton, ‘Explaining Pro-cyclical Fiscal Policy in African Countries’, (2008) Journal of African Economies 
451, 453. Cf: Lledo who argues that ‘The evidence of the impact on procyclicality of aid flows—a major source of 
government finance in SSA—is inconclusive.’ See V.D. Lledo et al, ‘A Tale of Cyclicality, Aid Flows and Debt: 
Government Spending in Sub-Saharan Africa’, (2011) 20 (5) Journal of African Economies 823, 826ff 839. Other 
commentators such as Dabla-Norris and others, argue that the cyclical properties of aid are dependent on the nature 
and magnitude of the shocks driving the cycle. See E. Dabla-Norris et al, ‘Business Cycle Fluctuations, Large Shocks, 
and Development Aid: New Evidence’, (2010) IMF Working Paper WP/10/240.  
17 See H. Kharas, ‘Measuring the Cost of Aid Volatility’, (July 2008) Wolfensohn Centre for Development Working 
Paper 3 Available at: 
<www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/07_aid_volatility_kharas/07_aid_volatility_kharas.pdf> 
accessed 09 July 2014. 
18 See H. Dang et al, ‘International Aid and Financial Crises in Donor Countries’, (2013) 32 European Journal of 
Political Economy 232; W. Englund, ‘Where Obama Might Say 'No': Foreign Aid’ [2008] National Journal  
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[3.1]  Remittance 
Remittance is a product of international migration, and it encompasses earning - either in 
cash or in-kind or social remittance (i.e., ideas, services, etc.) - sent from either the 
destination of migration to the place of origin;19 or from the source state to a territory other 
than the source state.20 It is either formal or informal. Remittance is formal when registered 
financial institutions within a state are utilised for the transfer. This includes remittance 
done through banks, companies whose business is money transfer (e.g. Western Union) or 
courier and freight companies (e.g. DHL). Informal remittance includes those done using 
routes like the hawala system,21 or individuals (family, friend and/or associates) who are 
travelling to the location(s) of the would-be recipient(s). The importance of remittance is 
growing for several reasons primarily linked to the growing volume of money involved; that 
is the volume of migration and the number of persons living outside their countries of 
origin. 22  Also, the growth in academic discourse, particularly its relation to HDI and 
development of TWCs,23 has contributed to a growing focus on the role of remittances in 
TWCs especially. 
Regarding the volume of money transferred, the World Bank put global remittance for 2011 
at USD381 billion24 with TWCs being the beneficiary of USD325 billion (approximately 74% 
                                                        
  19  K. Abdul Azeez and M. Begum, ‘International Remittances: A Source of Development Finance’, (2009) 4 
International NGO Journal 5, 300; A. Adepoju and A. Van Der Wiel, Seeking Greener Pastures Abroad: A Migration 
Profile of Nigeria, (Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd, 2010) 342   
  20 This subsumes remittance spent by nationals of states abroad for medical care and education abroad  
  21 Hawala remittance system is an informal banking arrangement that allow the transfer of funds both domestically 
and internationally without using formal financial institutions. They usually run parallel to and independent from the 
latter. Documentary requirements from both sender and recipient is minimal and this has made its utilisation attractive 
to persons involved in financial crimes international terrorism and terrorist financing as well as the international trade 
illicit psychotropic substances. See R. Ballard, ‘Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity 
within Informal Value Transmission Systems: The Operational Dynamics of Contemporary Hawala Networks’, 
(2005) 6 Journal of Banking Regulation 4, 319.  
  22 UN estimates put the global population of international migrants as at mid-year 2010 at 213 million. See UN, Trends 
in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (UN database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008) Available at: 
<http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp> accessed 25 January 2015. It should be noted that the above figure cannot 
be accurate as there is the possibility of it not incorporating the undocumented migrants who have not been counted 
or become part of official data    
23 L. Kipyegon, E. Nyamongo, and R. Misatib, ‘Remittances, Financial Development and Economic Growth in 
Africa’, (2012) 64 Journal of Economics and Business 240–260; A. Siddique, S. Selvanathan and E. Selvanathan, 
‘Remittances and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka’, (2012) 48 The 
Journal of Development Studies 8, 1045–1062; M. Masuduzzaman, ‘Workers’ Remittance Inflow, Financial 
Development and Economic Growth: A Study on Bangladesh’, (2014) 6 International Journal of Economics and 
Finance 8, 247-267; M. Maimbo and D. Ratha, Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects (Washington 
D.C.: World Bank, 2005); S. Jawaid and S. Raza, ‘Workers' Remittances and Economic Growth in China and Korea: 
An Empirical Analysis’, (2012) 5 Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies 3, 185-193; A. Ali, S. 
Imaia, N. Kaicker and R. Gaihab, ‘Remittances, Growth and Poverty: New Evidence from Asian Countries’, (2014) 
36 Journal of Policy Modelling 3, 524–538; and P. Guha, ‘Macroeconomic Effects of International Remittances: The 
Case of Developing Economies’, (2013) 33 Economic Modelling 292–305. 
  24 World Bank (2012) Migration and Development Brief, No.19. Washington, DC: World Bank 1.  
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of the total).25 According to the UN, in 2012, the top TWCs' recipients of remittances are India 
($70 billion), China ($66 billion), the Philippines ($24 billion), Mexico ($24 billion), and 
Nigeria ($21 billion).26 
 
Figure 1 above shows a steady increase in the volume of remittance as a source of funds into 
TWCs between 1990 and 2011. It also shows a significant gap between foreign Aid and 
remittance as a source of development funds to TWCs. Furthermore, compared with Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and private debt and portfolio equity, remittance has proved to be 
resilient, not having any sharp declines in its growth rate. Interestingly, the World Bank also 
reports that 'The size of remittance flows to developing countries is now more than three 
times that of official development assistance.'27 As such, does it present a viable alternative 
or compliment to Foreign Aid? To answer this question, it is important to examine the pros 
and cons of this source of development fund. 
Remittance has both micro and macroeconomic effects in TWCs. In relation to the former, it 
creates a social insurance structure for recipients as kinsmen abroad often provide support 
by making remittances (or increasing its volume) in reaction to unpalatable economic/ 
financial situations at home.28 According to Bodomo, 'The greatest advantage that foreign 
                                                        
  25  See World Bank, Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011 (2nd ed.) (2011) x, Available at: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf> accessed 25 January 2015.  
26 Ibid 2.  
27 Ibid.  
    28 See G. Clarke and S. Scott, Do Remittance Act like Insurance? Evidence from a Natural Disaster in Jamaica 
(January 2003), Available at: <http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new_publication_3/%7Bdfae0da7-7650-
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remittance funding has over foreign aid funding is that these remittance funds go directly to 
the remittance targets, the recipients most of the time.'29 Compared to foreign Aid, which can 
be misappropriated by government officials to the detriment of the people, remittance has 
the capacity actually to alleviate poverty and improve the HDI in TWCs. Another advantage 
of remittance is that unlike foreign Aid, they are devoid of conditionalities because they are 
usually gifts of love.30  
On the macroeconomic side, it has been shown that there is a positive relationship between 
remittance, the banking sector (or financial) development and economic growth. 31  Also, 
remittance is an important external source of capital for TWCs. In some TWCs, it has become 
the second highest external contributor to capital32 whilst constituting a substantial part of 
the GDP of some others. 33  The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
estimates that 1.9, 10 and 25.5% of the GDP of Turkey, Philippines and Lebanon respectively 
is from remittance.34 In many countries, it is an important tool for poverty alleviation35 and 
a very important economic index.  
                                                        
de11-afac-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf> accessed 05 February 2015. In this study carried out on households receiving 
remittance in Jamaica, it was demonstrated that remittance increased by 25 cent for every dollar of damage suffered 
when they were affected by an exogenous shock. 
29 Bodomo (n 2) 25-26.  
30 Ibid. it is not in all cases that remittance is viewed in such positive light. For example, remittance as a source of 
funding has also been associated with terrorist financing and money laundering. See generally J. Trautsolt and J. 
Johnsøn, ‘International Anti-Money Laundering Regulation of Alternative Remittance Systems: Why the Current 
Approach Does Not Work in Developing Countries’, (2012) 15 Journal of Money Laundering Control 4, 407 – 420. 
   31 See J. Sami, ‘Remittances, Banking Sector Development and Economic Growth in Fiji’, (2013) Vol. 3 No. 2 
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 503. See also, A. Noman and G. Uddin, ‘Remittances and 
Banking Sector Development in South Asia’, (2011) 8 International Journal of Banking and Finance 4, and B. Oke, 
O. Uadiale and O. Okpala, ‘Impact of Workers’ Remittances on Financial Development in Nigeria’, (2011) 4 
International Business Research 4, 218 – 225. 
   32 OECD, ‘International Migrant Remittances and their Role in Development’, in International Migration Outlook 
(France: OECD Publishing, 2006) 141. For instance, in 2007 and 2008, remittances rose to become the second highest 
source of foreign exchange inflow for Nigeria after proceeds from the sale of crude oil. See also, K. Abdul Azeez and 
M. Begum, ‘International Remittances: A Source of Development Finance’, (2009) 4 International NGO Journal 5, 
300; Adepoju and Van Der Wiel, (n 19) 351.  
33 P. Mitra, M. Selowsky and J. Zalduendo, Turmoil at Twenty: Recession, Recovery, and Reform in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2010). 
   34 See Far East. Available at: <http://www.ifad.org/remittances/maps/middle.htm> accessed 05 February 2015. Also, 
See The Unbanked: Market and Opportunities for Global Remittance (February 2009). Available at: 
<http://www.ecommlink.com/downloads/White_paper_Unbanked_Remittance_2.pdf> accessed 05 February 2015; 
D. Ratha, ‘Remittance: A Lifeline to Poor Countries’, Finance & Development (December 2009). Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/12/pdf/ratha.pdf> accessed 05 February 2015. 
35 In Nepal, the poverty level declined by 11 percentage points between 1995 and 2004, with a third to a half 
attributable to remittances. Household surveys have shown that remittances may have reduced the share of poor people 
in the population by 11 percentage points in Uganda, 6 percentage points in Bangladesh, and 5 percentage points in 
Ghana. See D. Ratha, ibid and R. H. Adams and A. Cuecueha, ‘The Impact of Remittances on Investment and Poverty 
in Ghana’, Vol. 50 (2013) World Development 24-40. The IBRD estimates that remittance reduced extreme poverty 
by over 35 % in Mexico, Dominican Republic and El Salvador. See also E. Rosser, ‘Immigrant Remittances’, (2008) 
Vol. 41:1 Connecticut Law Review 16. Available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1107485> accessed 05 February, 
2015.and A. Adepoju & A. van der Wiel, (n 32), 359 for further information on the positive effect of remittance on 
the development in some development of some TWCs.  
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In view of the magnitude of remittance and its importance, TWCs can access funds that are 
not of the same hue as Aid. Albeit the foregoing, one cannot but take cognisance of the fact 
that associated with it are some issues, which arguably, can depreciate its attractiveness as 
an option for development finance.  One of such is that they are ordinarily procyclical as they 
tend to be affected by the economic situation in the host (source) state - increasing with a 
cyclical upturn in the economy of the state and vice versa. With reference to this trait of 
remittance, it is argued that where it is catalysed by altruistic emotions (for example, the 
sustenance of dependants) or self-interest (for example, the accumulation of wealth in state 
of origin as is the case with illegal immigrants or immigrants with no intention of remaining 
permanently in the source state), the impact of economic downturns in source states are 
bound to be marginal at best per time and stable over time. This is because this combination 
of factors36 countervails the pro-cyclicality. The foregoing is also the basis of the resilience 
which remittance possess.37 Furthermore, the instability that the seeming pro-cyclicality 
brings about can be countered by securitisation of future remittance.38  
Securitisation is a transaction that involves a potential borrower pledging future hard 
currency receivables as collateral to a special purpose entity that issues the debt.39 With the 
securitisation of future remittances, TWCs are assured stable funds which are not subject to 
conditionality and which are not affected by the economic cycles in the donor state. 
Securitisation of future remittances ensures that TWCs get funding at terms convenient for 
it - or at the worst, pre-negotiated terms. This approach has been adopted by Ethiopia, which 
                                                        
36 From the perspective of a TWCs, these factors are the reason(s) for and/ or the remittance and they include self-
interest, need to repay intra/ inter family loans, intra/ inter family altruism. However, for a more ‘scientific’ 
explanation relating to the resilience of remittance flow vis-a-vis other types of financing for development in TWCs 
during economic downtimes, see S.  Mohapatra, et. el, ‘Outlook for Remittance Flows 2011-2012: Recovery After the 
Crisis, but Risks Lie Ahead’, (Nov. 8, 2010) 13 Migration and Development Brief, 2. Available at: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief13.pdf.> accessed 05 February, 2015. See also, A. Julca, ‘Can 
Immigrant Remittances Support Development Finance?’, (2013) 3 Special Issue Panoeconomicus 365, 367 where the 
author highlighted some factors which motivates remittances by nationals of TWCs.      
37 It possesses the ability to withstand the shocks in the economy and improve quickly after any downtime. The World 
Bank reports that the remittance fared better in comparison to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2009 as a result of 
the global financial crisis. The former declined 5.5 % as against 40 % decline of the latter. See World Bank, Migration 
and Remittances Fact Book 2011, (n 24) x.  
38 See M.Y. Mughal, ‘Remittances as Development Strategy: Stepping Stones or Slippery Slopes’, (2013) 25 Journal 
of International Development 583, 591 and W. Bin Dilshad, ‘Impact of Workers’ Remittances on Economic Growth: 
An Empirical Study of Pakistan’s Economy’, (2013) Vol. 8 No. 24 International Journal of Business and Management 
126 where remittance has been specifically recommended to Pakistan as alternative to financing economic growth in 
view of the volume of its remittance inflow    
39A. Shimeles, ‘Diaspora Bond and Securitisation of Remittances for Africa’s Development’, (2011) Vol. 1 Issue 7 
Africa Economic Brief 4. Available at: 
<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEB%20dec%202010%20(avril%202011)_
AEB%20dec%202010%20(avril%202011).pdf> accessed 05 February, 2015. For a discourse relating securitisation 
in general and that of workers remittance, see H. Hughes, ‘Understanding the Securitisation of Worker Remittances’, 
Available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1096700> accessed 05 February, 2015. 
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'has successfully implemented a 'Diaspora bond' – a kind of debt security issued to 
Ethiopians outside the country to enable the government to tap into their assets.'40 
From the foregoing, it is beyond conjecture that remittance is a veritable means of financing 
development in TWCs. The focus now is what modalities should be put in place to harness 
this potential source of developmental funding optimally. Consequently, it is suggested that 
remittance inhibitors (and cost) be reduced or removed where possible. This is because, as 
a result of the presence of intermediaries in the channel of remittance, a sizeable portion of 
remittance is gobbled up in cost that eventually reduces the actual volume of remittance sent 
and received.41  Some TWCs are already towing this path. For instance, while Zimbabwe 
through its apex bank launched the Homelink (Pvt) Ltd in February 2005 primarily to 
mobilise foreign currency remittances from the diaspora and remove inhibitions to it,42 
Bangladesh has adopted a similar model by floating a specialised bank - the Prabashi Kalyan 
Bank (PKB) in 2010 - for its migrant workers.43  
Furthermore, the government of TWCs are enjoined to design and implement financial 
inclusion policies. This can be 'kick-started' by getting hawaladars44 to register with the 
agency responsible for regulating financial intermediaries and impose sanctions on those 
who do not. The same should be demanded of remitters and recipients.45 This has benefits 
for the TWCs. These suggestions are made with the crusade against money laundering and 
terrorist financing in mind. When restrictions to remittance of funds are relaxed, the 
remitters who patronise informal routes are bound to migrate to the formal routes, thus 
bringing their transactions within the scrutiny of the relevant authority. With registration, 
hawala operators will be known and better controlled by the state. This has a domino effect 
as it strengthens the crusade against money laundering, terrorist financing etc. Secondly, it 
                                                        
40 Bodomo (n 29) 26. 
41 Transfer cost in Southern Africa is between 17-22%, for the Latin America-United States and Latin America-Spain 
corridors averages between 5-7% for every $200 of remittance. In 2008 global average remittance cost was 8.8% but 
dropped to 7.3% in 2011 as a result of the modalities implemented to reduce remittance cost. See Julca (n 36) 371. 
Also, the weighted average cost of remitting $200 to TWC in Q3 2011 ranged from 6.6% to 19.0%; with the Middle 
East and North Africa on the high end of the chart. See generally S. Mohapatra, et. al, ‘Outlook for Remittance Flows 
2012-2014’, (2011) 16 Migration and Development Brief. Available at: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECPROSPECTS/Resources/476882-
1157133580628/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief16.pdf> accessed 05 February, 2015. 
  42  See About Homelink. 
<http://homelinkzim.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21&Itemid=57> accessed 09 July 
2014. 
  43 It provides financial and intermediation services to potential migrant workers, those working abroad and recipients 
in Bangladesh. See H. Zaman and M. Ibne Akbar, ‘Exploring non-traditional Sources of Development Finance: The 
Case of Remittance in Bangladesh’, (2013) 13, 2 Progress in Development Studies 105, 113. See also, Julca (n 41) 
371 for another example of a cost reduction strategy referred to as the Directo a Mexico    
 44 Hawaladars are the providers of the service of informal money transfer. 
  45  El Salvador, Mexico and Bangladesh are examples of states that have created institutions to facilitate the 
implementation of these policies. As a matter of fact they provide models that can be replicated elsewhere. See Zaman 
and Ibne Akbar (n 43)113; Julca (n 43). 
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can also increase the revenue base of the state as the hawaladars can then be taxed after 
registration.  
[3.2]  Taxation 
Taxation is an important contributor to the development of any state and is bound to 
improve TWCs' development indices.46 The utilisation of taxation as a means of financing 
development of TWCs is devoid of the corollaries associated with the presence of Aid in their 
economy. For example, with taxation, revenue is made available to the government for use 
for general or specific purposes.47 The Ghanaian National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL) and 
the Communication Service Tax (CST) are examples of the use of tax to generate revenue for 
specific developmental purpose. The NHIL is levied pursuant to the Ghana National Health 
Insurance Act 2003 (Act 650) at the rate of 2.5% on the price of non-exempted goods and 
services consumed in Ghana48 to provide a broad range of health care services to Ghanaians 
through health insurance schemes. 49  The Ghanaian CST is levied on the use of 
communication services pursuant to the Communication Service Tax Act 2008 (Act 754) and 
is earmarked for the finance of the Ghanaian National Youth Employment Programme.50 
Another earmarked tax that has the capacity of funding development is the levy imposed on 
fuel and diesel sold within South Africa.51  Also, in Nigeria, the Tertiary Education Trust Fund 
and the National Information Technology Development Fund are examples of funds set up 
and financed via especially collected taxes.52 The Ghanaian, South African and Nigerian taxes 
                                                        
  46 Notably, the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) reiterated this point and stated categorically that they are committed to ventures that are capable 
of raising revenue to decrease aid dependency. ‘ATAF – OECD Workshop on Exchange of Information in Tax 
Matters’ held in Botswana, November 8 – 10, 2010 where the See Tax and Development, being a presentation at the 
aforementioned Workshop  
47 The Tertiary Education Trust Fund and the National Information Technology Development Fund are examples of 
funds set up and financed via especially collected taxes. See generally, Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment, 
etc.) Act 2011 and the National Information Technology Development Agency Act 2004. 
48The NHIL is piggy-backed on the collection mechanism of the Ghanaian value added tax and is collected by the 
Ghanaian Revenue Authority (GRA). See GRA, Tax Information: Value Added Tax, Available at: < 
http://www.gra.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=47> accessed 01 August 
2014.  
49For a discourse on the effect of the Ghana NHIS and extension the NHIL, see N.J. Blanchet, G. Fink and I. Osei-
Akoto, ‘The Effect of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme on Health Care Utilisation’, (June 2012) Vol. 46 
(2) 76-84 Available at: < http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3426378/#R8> accessed 01 August 2014.   
50Ibid.  
51The levy is the primary source of income for the South African Road Accident Fund (RAF) compensation scheme 
administered by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) administers the fuel levy and pays it to the RAF, in 
accordance with provisions of the Customs and Excise Act (No. 91) 1964 and the Road Accident Fund Act (No.56) 
1996 as amended by the RAF (Amendment) Act (No. 19) 2005.  
52 See generally, Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment, etc.) Act 2011 and the National Information 
Technology Development Agency Act 2004. 
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contribute to social security benefits and by extension, development within the 
jurisdictions.53  
Based on the foregoing, it is argued that with an effective and properly administered tax 
system, there is bound to be an improvement in the volume of revenue available to TWCs to 
fund development projects currently dependent on foreign Aid. The Nigerian tax system 
provides facts to justify this assertion. Since 2004, the Nigerian tax system has been 
undergoing a plethora of reforms geared towards its improvement. Amongst these were the 
formulation of a National Tax Policy; 54  the restructuring of the relevant tax authorities 
RTAs);55 and the process of tax administration.56 These reforms have led to a significant 
increase in the revenue generated from tax in Nigeria.57 
An increase in tax revenue in TWCs does not guarantee eradication of the social-economic 
challenges experienced in the foreign aid regime. However, a distinct advantage of taxation 
as a compliment to aid is that with taxation, revenue sourcing is not limited to only one tier 
of government. As such, sub-national governments which have constitutional powers to levy 
tax can generate the much needed revenue to meet their development objectives while been 
subject to more transparency and accountability criteria from the people in their 
constituents. An analogy to explain this point is found in TWCs like Nigeria that operates a 
federal system of government. Sub-national tiers like Lagos state which have been active in 
the reformation of their Internally Generated Revenue (IGI) base have not only generated 
the much needed income to fund its development projects but have also been more 
accountable to the people, especially when there has been perceived misappropriation of 
                                                        
53Research has shown that there is a nexus between social security and development. According to ‘social security 
guarantee people in TWCs a sustained satisfaction of their basic needs, provide opportunity for relief of the threat to 
their existence as well as guarantee protection against worsening life conditions. See generally, M. von Hauff, The 
Relevance of Social Security for Economic Development at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/01443002.pdf> accessed 
01 August 2014; B.O. Nwabueze, ‘Social Security in Nigeria’, being a 1989 Anniversary Lecture of the Nigeria 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies delivered on 7 September 1989 Available at: <http://www.nials-
nigeria.org/Editedbookcovers/ssn.pdf> accessed 01 August 2014. 
54 The National Tax Policy is a statement of Nigeria’s approach to taxation, both from the practical and normative 
point of view. It was developed through stakeholders’ consultation and was launched on 5 April 2012. See National 
Tax Policy (Nigeria: Federal Ministry of Finance, 2012) 
55 This has manifested in the granting of autonym to the RTAs which in turn has made it possible or the latter to 
operate outside the mainstream of government bureaucratic structure. Currently, the FIRS, Lagos Internal Revenue 
Service (LIRS) and the Adamawa State Board of Internal Revenue (i.e., RTAs siesed with the power to collect amongst 
others the taxes due to the Federal Government of Nigeria, the government of Lagos and Adamawa States respectively) 
autonomous of the government bureaucratic structure of their jurisdiction of operation   
56 Manifestation of this in tax systems is the automation of the process of tax collection which ended the era of tax 
fraud and diversion of funds meant for government coffers, the move from government or administrative assessment 
to self-assessment and the putting in place of legal structures to support these paradigm shifts 
57 Data sourced from the Tax Revenue Accounting Department (TRAD), FIRS show that for a six years period (2005 
– 2010) tax revenue generation has surpassed the collection target given it by the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
Collection figures (target against actual collection) are N 1,304.4billion and N 1,741.8billion; N 3,054.1billion and N 
1,866.2billion; N 1,753.3billion and N 1,846.9billion; N 2,274.4billion and N 2,972.2billion; N 1,909.0billion and N 
2,197.6billion; N 2,507.3billion and N 2,839.3billion.    
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their tax. In essence, taxation capabilities for sub-national governments in TWCs allow for 
consensual interaction and public participation in governance as well as make accountability 
a key element of that society. It also allows the input of the majority of the populace58 and 
reflects a bottom-up approach to dealing with the developmental issues of the state.  
Furthermore, unlike Aid, tax revenue is perceived as a collective contribution to the social 
welfare and development of the state, the allocation and spending of public funds attract 
greater public scrutiny. Thus, unconscionable spending of tax revenue is bound to attract 
criticism from many within as well as beyond the borders of the state. Because of these, there 
is bound to be a feeling of collective ownership and responsibility for the wellbeing of the 
state by all therein. Compared to Aid, taxation as a macroeconomic tool for financing 
development in TWCs is sustainable. Although Aid may reduce the pressure on domestic 
finance, it is susceptible to ebb. When this happens, the economies of recipient states 
contracts and they are plunged to a level where their HDI is often worse than it was before 
the entrance of the Aid. In contrast, tax is not cyclical, thus is more sustainability. In fact, 
should there by a downturn in the economy of a state, the government may choose to 
increase its tax base as a means to shore up national revenues.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the adoption of taxation is not totally devoid of issues that 
are capable of hindering its effectiveness and making it counterproductive. First, taxes may 
become of excessive and numerous; issues determined by the tax rates and the number of 
distinct tax payments to which a taxable person is subject to. Notably, TWCs tax rates and 
number of taxes is higher than the global average. According to a recent 
PricewaterhouseCoopers report, Africa and South America had an average total tax rate in 
2012 of 52.9% and 52.7% respectively as against world average of 26.7%; while Africa, 
Central America and the Caribbean, Central Asia and Eastern Europe and 36.1, 33.7 and 29.5 
distinct payments as against world average of 26.7. 59  These facts impact on the easy of 
manoeuvrability within the tax systems in the aforementioned regions, their ability to attract 
and retain investment and in general, their business environment. 
Another issue associated with taxation is its susceptibility to abuse and/or misuse. 
Prominent amongst these is the grant of waivers and incentives. The waivers and incentives 
take different forms, such as zero or reduced tax rate;60 loss carry forward (or backward) 
provision; (3) the grant of pioneer status to certain industries/enterprises or the designation 
                                                        
58 Internationally, public participation has been accepted as a criterion for sustainable development. Agenda 21 - a 
global action plan for all states on development and the environment and a product of the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) 1992. See Paragraph 23.2, UNCED, Agenda 21. UN Doc. A/CONF. 
151/26/Rev.1, 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
59  PWC, Paying Taxes 2014: The Global Picture, 31-32. Available at: <http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-
taxes/assets/pwc-paying-taxes-2014.pdf > accessed 05 February 2015. 
60 The situation is worsened where the exemption lacks provision as to its duration (or what is usually referred to as a 
sunset clause) or the government is in the habit of extending the exemption period.    
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of certain areas within the state as free trade zones.61  Such regimes are abused and/or 
misused where the process leading to it is not transparent, guided and/or regulated by clear 
and articulated policy objectives geared towards improving the economic standing of the 
state. In the foregoing circumstances, this is an issue that requires attention in TWCs because 
of the effects which include: (1) revenue base erosion and capital flight; 62  (2) market 
distortions and non-neutrality of the tax system as the existence of gains or incentives now 
influences investor decision;63 (3) inequity as beneficiaries would have lower after-tax cost 
to contend with compared to the after-tax cost for non-beneficiaries; (4) the impact on tax 
morality especially where taxpayers perception is that beneficiaries and the entire tax 
system are negative, etc. The employment of taxation as a complementary to aid in the 
development of TWCs could also be the genesis of harmful tax competition amongst them.64 
This arises when in a bid to make their tax regime attractive to investment; TWCs are drawn 
into a race to the bottom to provide the lowest tax rates oftentimes without consideration to 
optimality;65 the tax bases of other countries; its impact on global trade and investment 
patterns and neutrality of tax systems generally. 
[3.3]  Public-Private Partnership 
Public-private partnership (PPP) generally involves private sector investment in the 
provision of public services. There are several attempts at defining PPPs, many having 
evolved from institutional perspectives including those advanced by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), 66  Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development 
                                                        
61 These are usually abused where monitoring (inclusive of audit) of the industries/enterprises is inefficient and/or 
ineffective. 
62 The fate of TWCs is worsened where the beneficiaries are ‘footloose and quota hopping’ production companies or 
investors. Characteristically, they roam TWCs closing down in one country without paying the benefits or wages, and 
setting up shop in other countries for just a few years, after which they leave behind the same situation. See E. de 
Haan and M. V. Stichele, Footloose Investors: Investing in the Garment Industry in Africa (Amsterdam, SOMO Paper 
March, 2008) for an exposé on the activities of footloose investors in Africa. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1660426>   accessed 05 February 2015. 
63 See J. Furman, The Concept of Neutrality in Tax Policy, being testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Finance hearing on “Tax: Fundamentals in Advance of Reform,” April 15, 2008. Available at:  
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/testimony/2008/4/15%20tax%20neutrality%20furman/0415_tax
%20_neutrality_furman.pdf >   accessed 05 February 2015. 
64 For discourse on the concept of harmful tax competition and the efforts towards combating it, see OECD, Harmful 
Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998). Available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf> accessed 05 February 2015; The OECD’s Project on Harmful 
tax Practices: The 2004 Progress Report. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/30901115.pdf> accessed 
05 February 2015; The OECD’s Project on Harmful tax Practices: The 2006 Progress Report. Available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/tax/harmful/37446434.pdf> accessed 05 February 2015; R. S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The OECD 
Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Tenth Anniversary Retrospective’ (2009) Vol. 34, No. 3 Brook Journal of 
International Law 783-795  
65 Optimality involves balancing of the qualities of a ‘good’ tax or tax system.  It involves a design which takes into 
cognisance and blends together revenue yield (adequacy), equity, efficiency and simplicity. For an exposé on the 
subject, see J.  Alm, ‘What is an ‘Optimal Tax’ System’, (March 1996) Vol. 49 No. 1 National Tax Journal 117-133   
66  International Monetary Fund, Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/2004/pifp/eng/031204.pdf > 
accessed 05 February 2015. 
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(OECD),67 Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) of the World Bank,68 HM 
Treasury of the United Kingdom, 69  and the Asian Development Bank, 70  for examples. 
Nwangwu, after carefully distilling several definitions of PPPs proffers one that encapsulates 
the idea succinctly thus:   
long term relationship between public sector agencies and private sector entities 
under which the responsibility for any or all of the combination of designing, 
financing, construction, management and operation of public infrastructure and 
utilities that were traditionally undertaken by the public sector are contractually 
shared and jointly undertaken by both the public and private sector, usually in 
proportion to the kind of risks each party can best carry.71 
In essence, PPPs involve private investors bearing the financial burden of a public-interest 
project (infrastructure or service) with accompanying risks and reward/returns are shared 
according to a pre-determined formula by the personalities in the partnership. It usually 
results in the transfer and reallocation of the risk associated with a venture.72 
PPP, as a source of funding development in TWCs, has several advantages. These include 
bringing about national savings; a reduction on the strain on the limited public resources; 
and, promote efficiency in the utilisation of resources.73 PPPs are also beneficial as they 
promote an efficient procurement regime and reform the public sector,74 provide better 
value for money, reduce governmental debt levels while ensuring better efficiency in 
providing and running infrastructure services in more politically attractive forms than 
nationalisation or privatisation.75 The above benefits are possible because, under PPPs, the 
private investors usually bring to the relationship, the requisite capital, technical expertise, 
                                                        
67  J. Espigares and J. Segura, ‘Public Private Partnerships and Regional Productivity in the United Kingdom’, 
Available at: <http://www.reser.net/file/75439/> accessed 05 February 2015.  
68  PPIAF, Available at: <http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/WB%20-
%20PPP%20Units%202007.pdf> accessed 05 February 2015.  
69 H.M. Treasury, Available at: <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ppp_index.htm> accessed 05 February 2015.  
70  Asian Development Bank, Available at: 
<http://www.apec.org.au/docs/ADB%20Public%20Private%20Partnership%20Handbook.pdf > accessed 05 
February 2015. 
71 G. Nwangwu, ‘A Risk Based Approach to Enhancing Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects in Nigeria’, (2014) 
PhD thesis submitted to the University of Hull, 56. 
72  Ibid. See also, A. Akintoye and M. Macleod, ‘Risk Analysis and Management in Construction’, (1997) 15 
International Journal of project Management 1, 32. 
73 E. Egboh and E. Chukwuemeka, ‘Public-Private Partnership in Nigeria: The Challenges of Human Resource 
Management’, (2012) 1 Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review 5, 19. E. Cheung et 
al, ‘Reasons for implementing public Private Partnership Projects: Perspectives from Hong Kong, Australian and 
British practitioners’, (2009) 27 Journal of Property Investment and Finance 1, 81-95. 
74 S. Harris ‘Public Private Partnerships: Delivering Better Infrastructure Services’, (Working Paper) Inter-American 
Development Bank, Washington D.C. 3. 
75 For instance Savas is of the opinion that ‘privatisation’ and ‘contracting out’ are expressions, which generate 
opposition quickly. See E.S. Savas, Privatization and Public- Private Partnerships, (New York: Chatham House, 
2000) 2. 
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market savvy and sometimes, goodwill. The government, as the public sector participant the 
partnership bears the responsibility of creating a transparent and sound regulatory 
framework characterised by protection from expropriation/ nationalisation, respect for 
contract terms, etc. In Nigeria, for example, the federal government has developed the basic 
legislative and institutional framework to promote PPPs in the country.  These include the 
Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act, 76  the Foreign Exchange 
(Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act and the Infrastructure Commission 
Regulatory Commission (ICRC) (Establishment, Etc.) Act 2005, amongst others. 
Briefly, the NIPC Act allows 100% foreign participation in Nigeria business as well as 
repatriation of capital and dividends without any inhibition from the government while the 
ICRC Act provides inter alia for the participation of the private sector in financing the 
construction, development, operation or maintenance of infrastructure or development 
projects of the government of Nigeria through concession or contractual arrangements like 
PPP. In addition to the state's role in the creating an enabling environment for PPPs to 
flourish, other factors contribute to the success (or otherwise) of this development model 
including the proper allocation of risks and consistency of governments (and policies), for 
instance. The main point being put forward, though, is that PPPs present an avenue for TWCs 
to invest in the provision of infrastructure and development projects without having to rely 
on foreign Aid. The terms of most PPPs are generally geared towards the investor making 
profits on their investments rather than tying TWCs to agreements that include terms to 
make socio-economic transformations.   
It is noteworthy that TWCs increasingly embrace PPPs with successful outcomes. For 
example, PPPs targeted at the supply of wholesome water globally have succeeded by being 
able to serve the majority of the urban population in about 44 countries, the bulk of which 
are located in the third world.77 In Bangladesh, GrameenPhone, that is the second largest 
corporate taxpayer in Bangladesh was created via PPP. It has created improved telephone 
penetration from 0.3 % in 1997 to over 6 % in 2004 and led to the establishment of the 
Village Phone Programme, an initiative that aims to provide mainly low-income women in 
rural areas with an income which is more than the nation's per capita income.78 Another 
example of a PPP initiative is the Project Bhoomi in India that created an online system for 
                                                        
76 Cap. N117, LFN 2004. 
77 P. Marin, Public-Private Partnership for Urban Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing Countries, 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2009) 36. Available at: <http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/sites/ppiaf.org/files/FINAL-
PPPsforUrbanWaterUtilities-PhMarin.pdf> accessed 05 February 2015. 
78 See P. Braund, et al, Information and Communications Technology for Economic Development, (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2007) 23. Available at:   <http://www.riosinstitute.org/RiOSWBIediscussio.pdf > accessed 05 February 
2015. 
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the delivery of land titles to rural farmers. It succeeded in establishing an accurate and 
genuine land record and created a source of revenue for the Indian government.79  
The above projects are testamentary to the fact that with PPPs, projects that meet local needs 
and circumstances may be developed with quite obvious benefits to all the stakeholders. 
With foreign aid grants, money is more often than disbursed in accordance with the agenda 
of the funding party with beneficiaries scrambling to align with such objectives to derive 
benefits. With PPPs, the fluctuation in aid flow and conditionalities are avoided. PPP is driven 
by market forces, which dictate the volume and quality of investment in TWCs. PPPs are 
more sustainable than Aid because the involvement of private actors, (who are driven by 
profit) makes the choice of projects selected for implementation largely subject to business 
factors. Also, the conditions attached to their performance are informed by business factors 
which are more guaranteed to lead to results for the consumers. 
[4]  CONCLUSION 
Many TWCs rely extensively on foreign Aid to provide development infrastructure and 
initiatives to their citizens. However, for several reasons, including the conditionalities 
attached and the global recession, foreign Aid can no longer be considered "the" viable 
option to development funding in TWCs. The article has highlighted three of these 
alternatives that do not only provide funding for projects but also involve their nationals – 
whether local or in the diaspora – in the process. This way, there are less conditionalities (if 
any); interest in the projects/initiatives stretches beyond narrowly defined objectives as 
many aid grants are; and perhaps most importantly, are sustainable. The thrust of this paper 
is that these sources of development funding - remittances, taxes and PPPs – are more viable 
sources of development funding for TWCs as they seek to improve their HDI. While these 
sources of funding involve the participation of citizens of the country in question, they also 
are more sustainable and subjected to less conditionalities as foreign Aid which often 
contributes to adverse socio-economic conditions. This is more so that foreign Aid is 
dwindling and cyclical, especially with the global recession. 
Consequently, TWCs must shift from relying extensively on foreign Aid and begin to explore 
other forms of funding development projects and initiatives to get their citizens out of the 
doldrums of poverty. Involving citizens in the development process through any or all of the 
three means discussed has several advantages for the TWCs. The citizens of the country 
participate directly in the funding of development thus the have a stake in the successful 
delivery of projects and initiatives with consequences including greater public scrutiny of 
government activities; stronger likelihood of successful completion and delivery of 
                                                        
79  See Strategic Priorities of Digital Bangladesh, 4. Available at: 
<http://www.digitalbangladesh.gov.bd/documents/PPP_chap.pdf> accessed 05 February 2015. 
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development projects and initiative; and, more sustainable sources of development funding.  
As a result, TWCs must formulate policies, laws and institutions that can harness these 
sources of development funding.  
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